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Abstract
Integrating a Value-at-Risk constraint on a fund manager's wealth and ambiguity, we
present a model of optimal portfolio choice for a fund manager who allocates her wealth
between risky and riskless assets. When a fund manager controls asset composition,
her reactions dier with respect to an increase in only risk aversion and only ambiguity
aversion. When the sum of coecients of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion is xed,
the eect of risk aversion on risky investment dominates the eect of ambiguity aversion
in that stock holdings are dramatically smaller in the absence of ambiguity aversion than
in its presence.
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1 Introduction
Models of dynamic portfolio choice between risky and riskless assets have helped us to un-
derstand the testable empirical predictions between asset pricing and consequent portfolio
demand, and have been building blocks for testable general equilibrium models. Since the
seminal paper of Merton (1969, 1971), a plethora of studies have investigated the optimal
asset composition in a dynamic environment, however, their results have failed to make their
close relatives attractive prospects for use in practice.1
Along with this line, we present a model of optimal portfolio choice that integrates two
main motives that have been identied as quantitatively so important in asset pricing, port-
folio choice, and recently corporate nance. First, a portfolio constraint is driven by the
presence of a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint.2 Second, ambiguity (or model uncertainty)
about equity returns is taken into account when studying optimal portfolio choice. The com-
bination of portfolio constraints and ambiguity can be incrementally attributed exclusively
to the nancial literature on dynamic portfolio decisions. We hope that some results of this
paper will lend themselves to the study of implications for risk management and portfolio
choice in practice.
The bulk of literature on dynamic portfolio choice incorporates some of these motives.
Models of portfolio choice have been extended to include portfolio constraints that preclude
wealth from falling below some prespecied level (Grossman and Vila, 1989; Basak, 1995,
Grossman and Zhou, 1996).3 In addition, Basak and Shapiro (2001) yield testable predictions
1For example, notwithstanding a very important empirical observation of moderate equity holdings for
investors, the counterfactual results that produced a signicant amount of portfolio share have been obtained
from the existing literature. Further, in the population as a whole, stock market participation rates have
been very low, nevertheless it was optimal for an investor to invest in the stock market (Merton, 1969, 1971).
According to Gomes and Michaelides (2005), portfolio share was signicantly lower than 100% and the stock
market participation rate in the U.S. population was about 50%.
2VaR is the lowest tail percentile for losses from the distribution of prot and loss. VaR-based risk manage-
ment has been a popular standard choice by industry regulations (Jorion, 2006). Fund managers and nancial
institutions use VaR as the relevant risk measure (Hull, 2005). Whether VaR is an appropriate risk measure
is still debatable (Basak and Shapiro, 2001; Berkowitz and O'brien, 2002).
3A number of researchers have showed that portfolio adjustments are signicantly aected by various
portfolio constraints. For the details, see Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992), Cuoco (1997), and Cuoco and Liu
(2000).
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about optimal behavior consistent with Value-at-Risk-based risk management. More recently,
dierent from existing literature, Dai et al. (2011) explore the joint impact of position limits
of investors and transaction costs incurred when buying and selling stocks.
Understanding the implications of investors' concern about model uncertainty has been
so important in nance and hence the eects of uncertainty have also been widely studied
through a concept of ambiguity aversion.4 Since the seminal paper of Hansen and Sargent
(1995), Hansen and Sargent (2001) and Hansen et al. (2006) extend the model of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), who axiomatize max-min utility, to a continuous-time robust consumption
and portfolio choice model. Epstein and Schneider (2003) derive a recursive model for utility
building on an intertemporal model of multiple-priors utility. Garlappi et al. (2007) formulate
an ambiguity-averse fund manager's portfolio selection problem within the standard mean-
variance portfolio optimization. Anderson et al. (2009) measure the uncertainty as the degree
of disagreement of professional forecasters concerning the returns. They derive an uncertainty-
return trade-o and show that uncertainty can be a more important determinant of equity
returns than is risk, which is regarded as volatility in the standard asset pricing.
The study of robustness in optimal portfolio choice is economically signicant, but the
robustness itself contributes to resolution of various nancial puzzles. Uppal and Wang (2003)
show that ambiguity leads to a portfolio that substantially underdiversied relative to the
standard mean-variance portfolio. Maenhout (2004) provides an alternative explanation for
the equity premium puzzle by incorporating homothetic robustness. Liu et al. (2005) in-
4Importantly, ambiguity and risk must be distinguished from the point of view of probabilized and non-
probabilized events, respectively. Ambiguity refers to an attitude of preference for known risks over unknown
risks in decision theory. If a decision maker knows an appropriate probability distribution to guide choice,
then ambiguity is a known risk. However, when a decision maker is concerned about an unknown probability
distribution, we classify ambiguity as an unknown risk. This type ambiguity has been widely explored by
economists (Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). On the other
hand, Knight (1921) and Keynes (1936) show that decision makers are ambiguity averse, i.e., they have
Knightian uncertainty. Note that model uncertainty is equivalent to Knightian uncertainty when decision
makers do not know an exact probability distribution. This is why we sometimes consider the interchangeable
use of ambiguity and model uncertainty. However, model uncertainty is to some extent dierent to Knightian
uncertainty and this dierence should be taken into account when studying ambiguity (or model uncertainty)
(Guidolin and Rinaldi, 2013). In this paper, ambiguity (or model uncertainty) is considered as a particular
type of model misspecication following Maenhout (2004), i,e., uncertainty about return processes.
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vestigate the relationship between asset pricing and imprecise knowledge about rare events,
and assert that the option smirk can be explained by ambiguity aversion against rare events.
Recently, Ju and Miao (2012) obtain various asset pricing implications by developing a gen-
eralized recursive smooth ambiguity model: the procyclical pattern of price-dividend ratios,
the countercyclical pattern of equity premia and equity volatility, the leverage eect, and the
mean reversion of excess returns.
Integrating a VaR constraint on a fund manager's terminal wealth and ambiguity (or
model uncertainty), we present a model of optimal portfolio choice for a fund manager who
has to allocate her wealth between risky and riskless assets. To examine the eects of varying
coecients of risk and ambiguity aversions in the simplest possible environment, we consider
a nancial market with a constant investment opportunity set in a partial equilibrium. We
try to devote our attention on investigating how optimal asset composition of a fund manager
is aected by the eects of risk and ambiguity aversions, under a VaR constraint on her nal
wealth. We believe our paper is the rst to integrate ambiguity into the portfolio choice
while taking into account a realistic portfolio constraint such as the VaR constraint which is
a standard choice by industry regulations.
Our end state is to complement two important articles by solving a fund manager's prob-
lem explicitly and by obtaining results numerically for the more general case of optimal
portfolio choice. Basak and Shapiro (2001) study an optimal portfolio choice with a VaR
constraint and conclude that the VaR constraint often leads to fund managers' aggressive
stock investment. Maenhout (2004) takes ambiguity about equity returns into account when
studying optimal portfolio decisions and asserts that the eects of ambiguity signicantly
reduce the demand for equities. We show that the aggressive investment due to the consid-
eration of the VaR constraint is true in the absence of the eects of ambiguity. However, in
the presence of ambiguity, the eect of the VaR constraint is mitigated.
One can argue that as in Maenhout (2004), ambiguity aversion raises the level of risk
aversion by the amount of ambiguity aversion and hence that the eect of ambiguity aversion
on a fund manager's asset composition is trivial, even under a VaR constraint on her terminal
wealth. However, when a fund manager controls asset composition, her reactions dier with
respect to an increase in only risk aversion and only ambiguity aversion. When the sum of
coecients of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion is xed, the eect of risk aversion on risky
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investment dominates the eect of ambiguity aversion in the sense that stock holdings are
dramatically smaller in the absence of ambiguity aversion than in its presence. Accordingly,
dynamic portfolio decision is more dependent on the fund manager's risk aversion rather than
on the level of ambiguity aversion.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe nancial markets and clarify
a concept of ambiguity, and introduce a portfolio choice with the VaR constraint. In Section
3, we provide analytical results for a fund manager's optimal asset composition-and hence
wealth-by integrating the VaR constraint on her nal wealth and ambiguity. In Section 4,
we show numerical implications for ambiguity and optimal asset composition with the VaR
constraint with reasonably calibrated market parameters. In Section 5, we check robustness
against an expected shortfall constraint. In Section 6, we conclude the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Financial Markets
A fund manager can trade two assets in a nancial market: a risk-free asset (e.g., a bond) and
a risky asset (e.g., a stock). The bond price grows at a continuously compounded, constant
rate r > 0. The stock price S(t) is given by a geometric Brownian motion:5
dS(t) = S(t)dt+ S(t)dB(t);
where  > r is the expected rate of the stock return,  > 0 is the volatility of the return
on the stock, and B(t) is a standard Brownian motion dened on an appropriate probability
space. Here,  and  are same with the mean and standard deviation of the return on the
stock, respectively, and summarize the investment opportunity provided by the stock, i.e.,
they represent the expected return and risk in the nancial market. We assume that r, , 
are constant, i.e., that investment opportunity is constant.6
We assume that the utility of a fund manager depends only on the market value of her
portfolio at a nite horizon. Although much of our analysis might be applicable to the problem
5The assumption of a geometric Brownian motion for the stock price process is standard in the nancial
literature on investment (Merton, 1969, 1971).
6For treatment of optimal portfolio choice in the presence of a stochastic investment opportunity, see Chanko
and Viceira (2005) and Liu (2007).
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with intermediate consumption, we devote our attention to the case where the fund manager
wishes to maximize her utility of wealth on a deterministic time. In the literature studying
mutual fund industry, the problem of maximizing terminal utility of wealth is commonly
considered and consistent with a linear fee structure of mutual fund companies (Dai et al.,
2011). Further, our problem is appropriate for a fund manager who is evaluated on her fund
performance in the time horizon of a year or 6 months (Gompers, 1994; Marston and Craven,
1998; Edmans, 2009).
The wealth process W (t) of the fund manager with an initial wealth W (0) = w > 0 is
given by
dW (t) = fr + (t)(  r)gW (t)dt+ (t)W (t)dB(t);
where (t) is the fraction of wealth invested in the stock at time t. The fund manager
accumulates wealth at the rates equal to fr + (t)(  r)g. Note that (  r) represents the
positive risk premium obtained from risk taking. Since she invests in the stock market and
hence is exposed to stock market risk, which is captured by random uctuations of wealth
following the term involving the Brownian motion B. Observe that consumption is omitted
from the wealth process. However, for pension asset managers, consumption can be modeled
as lump sum payments or as a continuous rate. More realistic case for insurance companies
is to model consumption as lump sum payments. The sum over all payouts to all contract
holders is the total cash ow at a specic time point. For consideration of intermediate lump
sum consumption at discrete time points, see Kraft and Steensen (2013).
We consider a VaR constraint in a fund manager's optimal portfolio choice. Following
Basak and Shapiro (2001), we introduce the VaR constraint:
PfW (T ) Wg  1  ; (1)
which means that the fund manager will lose more thanW (T ) W with probability 0    1.
The VaR constraint considered in this paper reduces to the case of portfolio insurance, which
always constrains the terminal wealth to be above the level W when  = 0 (Grossman and
Vila, 1989; Basak, 1995; Grossman and Zhou, 1996). The case of 0 <  < 1 allows the
terminal wealth to be below W with a probability . The VaR constraint is never binding
when  = 1.
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2.2 A Portfolio Choice with Ambiguity
We consider a fund manager who would like to nd the maximal score of her constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility preference for terminal wealth at time T 2 (0;1). To incorporate
ambiguity aversion (or model uncertainty) of the expected rate of the stock return, we adopt
the robust preference structure of Anderson et al. (2003). We consider an optimal portfolio
choice in the absence of the VaR constraint to improve understanding of ambiguity aversion
(Maenhout, 2004). The manager maximizes her CRRA utility preference for nal wealth at
time T under a worst-case scenario for h(t):
V (t; w) = max

min
h
Eht
h Z T
t
f(s)W (s)h(s)g2
2	
 
s; w
 ds+ W (T )1 
1  
i
;
where Eht is the expectation taken at time t under an alternative measure Qh which is equiva-
lent to a reference measure P and 	(s; w) measures the strength of the ambiguity aversion (or
the preference for robustness). We consider the Radon-Nikodym derivative of an alternative
measure Qh with respect to the reference measure P:
exp
nZ T
0
(t)W (t)h(t)dB(t)  1
2
Z T
0
 
(t)W (t)h(t)
2
dt
o
so that dBh(t)  dB(t)   (t)W (t)h(t)dt is a standard Brownian motion under Qh by the
Girsanov Theorem. As a result, the wealth process of the fund manager can be restated as
the following:
dW (t) = [r + (t)(  r) + 2(t)2W (t)h(t)]W (t)dt+ (t)W (t)dBh(t); (2)
where 2(t)2W (t)h(t) can be regarded as the perturbed amount of the expected rate of
return to the total wealth where the fund manager does not fully trust the reference measure
P.7 As the manager is more concerned about the model uncertainty (the larger h(t)), the
more substantial perturbations are considered in her wealth management.
In this case, we obtain the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
0 = max

inf
h
h
Vt+fr+( r)gwVw+ 1
2
22w2Vww+
22w2hVw+
1
2	(t; w)
22w2h2
i
: (3)
7The distorted drift of the wealth process can be interpreted as robustness against ambiguity (or model
uncertainty) in terms of a change of measure from the reference measure to the alternative measure (Cont,
2006).
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The drift adjustment h is chosen to minimize the three terms of the HJB equation (3). The
rst term Vt + fr + (   r)gwVw + 1
2
22w2Vww comes from the classical Merton's (1969,
1971) Bellman equation. The second one, 22w2hVw, stems from the drift adjustment term
in the wealth process (2). Finally, the
1
2	(t; w)
22w2h2 term represents an entropy penalty
(Anderson et al. 2003) in which 	(t; w)  0 measures the strength of the ambiguity aversion
(or the preference for robustness). Actually, in this paper the ambiguity aversion is replaced
by the homothetic robustness as in Maenhout (2004). We introduce a nonnegative constant
 as
	(t; w) =

(1  )V (t; w) :
Hereafter, we let   0 denote the ambiguity aversion (or the homothetic robustness). As an
extreme case when  = 0 the fund manager cannot choose any nonzero values of h and in
turn, she is not ambiguity-averse. When  =1, the manager should choose the largest value
of h, so that it results in minimizing the drift of wealth process (2) as much as possible; in
this case, the manager is extremely ambiguity-averse.
Now we explore the eects of ambiguity aversion on the optimal asset composition for
a fund manager who chooses to allocate her wealth between risky and riskless assets, under
a VaR constraint on her terminal wealth. This is considered as the following optimization
problem with a constraint:
V (t; w) = max

min
h
Eht
h Z T
t
f(s)W (s)h(s)g2
2	
 
s; w
 ds+ W (T )1 
1  
i
;
subject to
PfW (T ) Wg  1  :
3 Analytical Results
We use the dynamic programming approach to solve the fund manager's problem with the VaR
constraint and ambiguity aversion (Kraft and Steensen, 2013). We specify the main idea of
Kraft and Steensen (2013) and then apply it to our optimal portfolio choice problem. First,
we consider only ambiguity aversion for the optimal asset composition; then our problem
reduces to Maenhout (2004) without intertemporal consumption choice in a nite horizon
set-up.
8
We introduce benchmark portfolio X as follows: X consists of two assets; a risk-free
investment and a risky investment. By substituting optimal risky investment  and endoge-
nous drift adjustment h obtained from the HJB (3) into the wealth process (2), we obtain
the dynamics for benchmark portfolio X:8
dX(t) =

r +

 + 

X(t)dt+

 + 
X(t)dB(t); X(0) = x > 0;
where  = (   r)= denotes the Sharpe ratio and  =    + is the Sharpe ratio ad-
justed with ambiguity aversion . In the absence of the VaR constraint, a fund manager
with ambiguity aversion by investing in the stock market earns instantaneous prot at the
expected rate of r+=(+ ), which is higher than the risk-free interest rate r. This is the
compensation for bearing market risk from stock investment and this compensation decreases
with risk aversion  and ambiguity aversion . In fact, the prot decreases with the so-called
eective risk aversion +. However, the eect of ambiguity aversion on benchmark portfolio
X is not trivial, because the Sharpe ratio  adjusted with  contributes to the expected rate
of benchmark portfolio return.
Additionally, the return for X is signicantly aected by ambiguity aversion, due to the
volatility term =( + ). As in Maenhout (2004), risk aversion  is increased by  to  + .
Then the volatility of X decreases with respect to an increase in  +  and subsequently, the
volatility is expected to be lower in the presence of ambiguity aversion than in its absence.
For pension asset managers who have inows and outows by contract holders, consump-
tion can be implemented as either a consumption rate or lump sum payments. Let's consider
intermediate consumption choice in the managers' objective function. This is applicable to
the case where stakeholders of an insurance company obtain utility of the cash-ows from the
payments by policy holders. Then the drift term in the bechmark portfolio process is reduced
by the amount of consumption.9 From a practical point of view, the pension fund managers
have inows and outows at a regular basis. In this case, their benchmark portfolio process
has additional minus terms involving lump sum payments. Regardless of whether or not
consumption is modeled as either a consumption rate or lump sum payments, consumption
8For the details of derivations of the dynamics for X, see Appendix 7.1.
9According to Maenhout (2004), the intertemporal consumption rule with ambiguity aversion in a nite
horizon is the standard Merton's solution except for that the level of risk aversion is raised by the amount of
ambiguity aversion.
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aects the benchmark portfolio return negatively. Accordingly, a fund manager controls as-
set composition conservatively in the presence of consumption, ceteris paribus. For technical
simplicity, we restrict our attention to the case where there is no utility from consumption
and no constraint on consumption.10
The benchmark portfolio takes a major role in a fund manager's optimal portfolio choice
with the VaR constraint. In the presence of the VaR constraint, the ambiguity-averse fund
manager formulates her portfolio strategy based on the benchmark portfolio. In the next
section, we will show that the portfolio consists of positions in options contingent on the
benchmark portfolio. Importantly, the relationship between the benchmark portfolio and the
strike prices at terminal time is a key determinant of terminal wealth management.
We state a theorem concerning wealth process W and optimal investment  in the stock
for an ambiguity-averse fund manager with the VaR constraint. We obtain analytical results
characterized by benchmark portfolio X. To begin with, we introduce the classical Black and
Scholes (1973) model. We denote the call option value by
Call(t; x; r; ;K) = N
 
d1(t; x; r; ;K)

x N d2(t; x; r; ;K)Ke r(T t);
where
d1(t; x; r; ;K) =
1

p
T   t
h
ln
 x
K

+

r+
2
2

(T   t)
i
; d2(t; x; r; ;K) = d1(t; x; r; ;K) 
p
T   t;
and N() is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Here, x
is the price of the underlying asset at time t, r is the risk-free interest rate,  is the volatility
of returns of the underlying asset, and K is the strike price. The put option value is given by
put-call parity as
Put(t; x; r; ;K) = N
   d2(t; x; r; ;K)Ke r(T t)  N   d1(t; x; r; ;K)x:
Theorem 3.1 An ambiguity-averse fund manager makes robust decisions for portfolio man-
agement. Specically, the manager's wealth process W (t) follows
W (t) = X(t) + Put

t; x; r;

 + 
;W

  Put

t; x; r;

 + 
; k

  (W   k)e r(T t)PQfX(T ) < kg;
(4)
10Kraft and Steensen (2013) derive results for constrained portfolio problems that have constraints on
consumption and wealth in the absence of ambiguity aversion. We leave the fund management problem with
ambiguity aversion and consumption as an extension of the paper.
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where  is ambiguity aversion and k is a constant to be determined by the VaR constraint,
and Q is a risk-neutral measure. Here, benchmark portfolio X follows
dX(t) = rX(t)dt+

 + 
X(t)d ~B(t); X(0) = x > 0;
under the Q measure.11 The optimal investment (t) in the stock follows
(t) =
  r
2
Wx(t)
W (t)
1h

x +

(1 )V (t;w)Vx(t; w)
i ;
where fx denotes the derivative of f with respect to x.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2. Q.E.D.
The wealth process (4) for an ambiguity-averse fund manager with the VaR constraint in
Theorem 3.1 is a combination of portfolio insurance and a short position in binary options.
Equivalently, the wealth consists of a portfolio strategy without the VaR constraint and an
appropriate position in corridor options. Importantly, ambiguity aversion  directly aects
option prices in the wealth process (4) by the volatility term =(+) of benchmark portfolio
X.
The ambiguity-averse fund manager invests in the benchmark portfolio; this is the rst
term X of the right hand side in (4). As previously noted, the manager makes robust decision
against her ambiguity aversion, as a result, the ambiguity aversion has an important inuence
on the expected rate of return and volatility for the benchmark portfolio. The decision
whether or not to invest in the benchmark portfolio is robust against the ambiguity aversion,
but cannot constrain the manager's wealth to be above the oorW and hence does not satisfy
the VaR constraint.
To reect the VaR constraint in wealth management, the manager can take a position in
a put option. Purchasing a put option with strike price W is the simplest strategy. This is
the so-called portfolio insurance strategy. In the wealth process (4) the second term of the
right hand side reects such strategy. The dierence between our strategy and traditional
portfolio insurance strategy is induced by ambiguity aversion of a fund manager. Moreover,
our strategy is less expensive than the traditional one because the volatility =( + ) of the
benchmark portfolio decreases with the nonnegative ambiguity aversion  and hence results
in a lower price of the put option on the less volatile benchmark portfolio.
11 ~B(t)  B(t) + t is a standard Brownian motion under the Q measure.
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Notwithstanding the perfect strategy that maintains wealth to be above W in all states,
it still requires expense to purchase the put option. The fund manager knows that the
probability that her wealth is signicantly lower than W is very small in favorable states
or economic expansions. Allowing the shortfall of wealth from W within some tolerance
is eective in reducing costs for wealth management with the VaR constraint. In fact, the
shortfall is achieved by a short position in a put option with a lower strike price thanW (third
term of the right hand side in (4)). However, in exchange for allowing the shortfall from W
the manager is exposed to large losses during unfavorable states or economic downturns. This
gives rise to the last term of the right hand side in (4).
Concerning optimal risky investment , Theorem 3.1 yields that ambiguity aversion of
a fund manager signicantly aects her risky portfolio management. Most importantly, the
eects of ambiguity aversion are not monotone with ambiguity aversion, which is contrary
to Maenhout (2004) who shows that ambiguity aversion  combines with risk aversion  as
eective risk aversion  + . The ratio between the rst derivative of value function and the
value function itself is included in the risky investment  with ambiguity aversion . As a
result, risk aversion  and ambiguity aversion  aect the stock holdings separately.
Corollary 3.1 The terminal wealth W (T ) follows
W (T ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
X(T ) if X(T ) < k;
W if k  X(T ) < W;
X(T ) if X(T ) > W:
Proof. The proof of the corollary is straightforward from the proof of Theorem 3.1. For the
details, see Appendix 7.2. Q.E.D.
As previously noticed, the fund manager's robust wealth management consists of portfo-
lio insurance and a short position in binary options. Here, we have stressed that benchmark
portfolio X is the underlying asset of the options and highly dependent on the manager's am-
biguity aversion . Corollary 3.1 yields that terminal wealth W (T ) resembles option payos;
the fact that whether or not the price X of benchmark portfolio is under or over the strike
prices at terminal time T is a key determinant of W (T ). Accordingly, the role of ambiguity
aversion in managing wealth is important. Specically, the manager's wealth is exactly the
same as the benchmark portfolio X if the terminal value X(T ) is signicantly lower than
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strike price k or higher than strike price W . If X at T lies between the strike prices, then
the terminal wealth W (T ) becomes the oor W . This option-like payo means that the fund
manager protects her wealth to be above the oor W if the benchmark portfolio performs
well in the market, but exposes her wealth to large losses if the benchmark portfolio is poor.
4 Numerical Implications
4.1 Baseline Parameters
We set the baseline parameters as follows: r = 3:71%, the annual rate of return from rolling-
over 1-month T-bills during the time period of 1926   2009,12  = 11:23% and  = 19:54%,
the return and standard deviation of a portfolio consisting of the world's large stocks during
the same time period.13 Gompers (1994), Marston and Craven (1998), Edmans (2009) argue
that fund managers are myopic because they are evaluated on their fund performance in the
time horizon of a year or 6 months; therefore, we set terminal time for a fund manager as
T = 1. We also take the probability of allowing the shortfall from the VaR constraint as
 = 1%. Following Basak and Shapiro (2001), we choose the value for the oor of wealth as
W = 0:9 and initial value for the underlying asset X as x = 1.
The remaining parameters to be calibrated are the coecient of relative risk aversion
 and ambiguity aversion . For the calibration, we follow Maenhout (2004) who suggests
guidance in determining a reasonable value for  by using optimal portfolio. Specically,
for low, moderate, and high risk aversion, Maenhout (2004) shows how dierent values of 
generate portfolio share and match pessimistic scenarios that contain equity premia in the
3% range (Cochrane, 1998).
The analytical results for the wealth process and optimal investment in the stock indicate
that the wealth is signicantly aected by the VaR constraint and accordingly, that the risky
investment also varies according to the changes in the wealth. In this sense, not just risk
aversion and ambiguity aversion, but the VaR constraint inuence how optimal portfolio is
determined. Hence, we calibrate the parameters values for  and  in the absence of the VaR
constraint, thereby removing the eect of the VaR constraint on portfolio share.
12Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
13pp. 170 of Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2011).
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When we eliminate the terms stemming from the VaR constraint in the wealth process
(4), the optimal investment  in the stock reduces to
(t) =
  r
( + )2
;
which is exactly the same as the portfolio share in Maenhout (2004). We report the sensitivity
of risky investment and equity premium to changes in risk aversion  and ambiguity aversion
 (Table 1). Portfolio share and equity premium heavily depend on the parameter values for
 and : an increase in  or  (or both) reduces both portfolio share and equity premium.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
True equity premium is 6%, which is the historical average value (Gomes and Michaelides,
2005; Benzoni et al., 2007; Wachter and Yogo, 2010). In this paper, we choose a conservative
equity premium of 3% to reect pessimistic scenarios. The 3% worse case premium is not
distinguishable from the 6% true equity premium when the data of a century-long time series
are utilized (Maenhout, 2004). We set  = 2, which is the standard and moderate risk
aversion. Then the reasonably calibrated value for  is 3; it generates 39:4% portfolio share
and resolves the moderate equity holdings puzzle (or equivalently, the fact that portfolio share
is signicantly lower than 100%).
We summarize the calibration results for parameters in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
4.2 Ambiguity and Optimal Asset Composition with VaR Constraint
In this section, we investigate how a fund manager's asset composition is aected by the joint
consideration of the VaR constraint and the manager's ambiguity aversion. Concerning the
wealth process for the fund manager, when we consider the ambiguity aversion, it just seems
to increase risk aversion  by  + . In this sense, the ambiguity-averse fund manager may
behave with not risk aversion  alone, but with eective risk aversion  + . The question
of whether or not the eect of ambiguity aversion is also monotone with the VaR constraint
and just sums with the amount of risk aversion is addressed by numerical analysis.
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Terminal wealth management. We have shown that terminal wealth has an option-like
payo depending on the performance of benchmark portfolio. Terminal wealth management
yields a discontinuity at k (Figure 1); this implies that at maturity a fund manager allows
the shortfall of her wealth from the oor W with probability . If the benchmark portfolio
underperforms in a nancial market, or equivalently if X is below k, then wealth of the fund
manager is exposed to large losses. In this sense, k is a tolerance for bearing losses. An
increase in k reduces tolerance for losses.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
When a fund manager makes decisions in managing her wealth against ambiguity aversion,
the exposed losses are signicantly reduced. Actually, the discontinuity in terminal wealth is
smaller in the presence of ambiguity aversion than in its absence (Figure 1). The reasonably
calibrated value  = 3 for ambiguity aversion induces a larger value for k, so that the fund
manager willingly bears smaller losses.
We investigate the eect of ambiguity aversion on a fund manager's wealth management
(Table 3). Specically, when we x ambiguity aversion  = 3, the tolerance k for bearing
losses increases as risk aversion  increases. Similarly, when  = 5, the tolerance for losses also
increases as  increases. This implies that the fund manager tends to have smaller tolerance
for bearing losses as the sum  +  of coecients of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion
increases.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
One can argue that as in Maenhout (2004), ambiguity aversion raises the level of risk
aversion by the amount of ambiguity aversion and hence that the eect of ambiguity aversion
on wealth management is trivial. However, when a fund manager manages her wealth, her
reactions dier with respect to an increase in only risk aversion and only ambiguity aversion
(Table 3). Importantly, when sum + is constant, the tolerance k for losses varies depending
upon the combination of (; ). For example, the tolerance k = 0:8754 when (; ) = (2; 3),
and k = 0:8911 when (; ) = (5; 0). The larger value 0:8911 in the absence of ambiguity
aversion than the value 0:8754 in the presence of ambiguity aversion implies that a fund
manager manages wealth, depending more on her risk preference for market risk (i.e., risk
aversion) than the level of ambiguity against equity returns (i.e., ambiguity aversion).
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Surprisingly, a fund manager does not allow any shortfall of her wealth from the oor
W , once risk aversion (or ambiguity aversion or the sum of coecients of risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion) approaches a threshold level. In this sense, the highly risk-averse or
ambiguity-averse fund manager is not aected by the VaR constraint, because in that case
she is already suciently conservative to maintain her wealth to be above the oor W . To
generate larger values of k than W ,  +  must exceed about 5.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
The tolerance k for bearing losses varies with a fund manager's investment opportunity
(Table 4). The fund manager is willing to bear larger losses, which is captured by a smaller
value for k, as the investment opportunity improves, if the expected return on the stock
increases, or the volatility of the return decreases. Apparently, improvement in investment
opportunity osets the negative eect of the underperformance of the benchmark portfolio.
Time-t wealth management. We have shown that an ambiguity-averse fund manager
with the VaR constraint manages her time-t wealthW (t) through a combination of a portfolio
insurance and a short position in binary options (Figure 2). The benchmark portfolioX(t) has
an important inuence on wealth management; time-t wealth of the fund manager increases
as the value of X increases, but shows a concavity when the benchmark portfolio stays in
an intermediate region. The concavity of wealth becomes remarkable as time t approaches
terminal time T ; this is because near terminal time the fund manager tries very hard to satisfy
the VaR constraint and hence raises her wealth as much as possible. Accordingly, at terminal
time she allows a shortfall from the oor W with probability , resulting in a large drop in
her wealth at X(t) = k.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
Importantly, a fund manager's robust decision against uncertainty in stock returns would
have a large eect on her time-t wealth management. In the absence of ambiguity aversion,
the each inection point of wealth is nearly the same for four cases of time t, whereas it
shifts on right side in the presence of ambiguity aversion (Figure 2); this shift implies that the
ambiguity-averse fund manager is conservative in managing her wealth in that she increases
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wealth in advance even though the benchmark portfolio performs well, or that the benchmark
portfolio X is relatively higher than that in the absence of ambiguity aversion. Additionally,
the amount of drop in wealth near the terminal time is signicantly smaller in the presence
of ambiguity aversion than in its absence.
Optimal risky investment. Merton (1969, 1971) derives an investment rule (fraction (t)
of wealth invested in a stock)
(t) =
  r
2
:
This means that stock holdings are dependent on the Sharpe ratio, (   r)=, and on the
coecient of an investor's relative risk aversion. Intuitively, as investment opportunity im-
proves, stock investment increases. As risk aversion increases, investment in the stock will
decrease. When we consider the VaR constraint in the portfolio choice, Merton's investment
rule is no longer valid. The optimal risky investment  for a fund manager is not a constant
and varies with the VaR constraint (Figure 3). We will explain the details of risky investment
in the absence of ambiguity aversion.
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
Merton's investment rule holds when wealth is lower than W1 or greater than W4 (Figure
3); i.e., the manager is only aected by the VaR constraint if wealth is between these values.
Surprisingly, the fund manager reduces stock holdings as wealth increases from W1 to W2.
Instead, she saves more and is willing to accumulate wealth so that the VaR constraint is
satised at the terminal time. As she accumulates wealth to W2, investing more in the stock
is certain to increase her wealth. Thus, for wealth between W2 and W3 the fund manager
shows aggressive stock investment with the expectation that optimally managed wealth by
this investment satises the VaR constraint at the terminal time. As wealth approaches
W3, the fund manager again sharply decreases risky investment because she has accumulated
a large amount of wealth. When the fund manager has wealth between W3 and W4, she
increasingly follows Merton's investment rule as wealth approaches W4 and follows the rule
when wealth exceeds W4.
Reasonably calibrated ambiguity aversion  signicantly reduces stock holdings (Figure
3). In particular, the eect of the VaR constraint that leads to aggressive stock investment is
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mitigated when a fund manager makes a robust decision against uncertainty of stock return for
stock investment. In fact, this observation is expected by the results of Maenhout (2004) that
portfolio share decreases with respect to an increase in eective risk aversion due to ambiguity
aversion. Hence, one may conclude that the eect of ambiguity aversion on optimal risky
investment is just the result obtained when we raise the coecient of relative risk aversion by
the level of ambiguity aversion. However, in the Analytical Results section we demonstrated
that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion aects risky investment separately.
[Insert Figure 4 here.]
When wealth is suciently small or large optimal risky investment  follows the invest-
ment rule proposed by Maenhout (2004). In this case, the eect of ambiguity aversion is
trivial in that it increases risk aversion by an amount equal to the level of ambiguity aversion.
However, in the presence of the VaR constraint the eects of risk aversion and ambiguity
aversion should be discriminated. In Figure 4, we assume that the sum of coecients of
risk aversion and ambiguity aversion is xed; in this case the eect of risk aversion on risky
investment dominates the eect of ambiguity aversion in the sense that stock holdings are
signicantly smaller in the absence of ambiguity aversion than in its presence for wealth be-
tween W2 and W3:
14 Similarly as in terminal wealth management, risky investment is more
dependent on the fund manager's risk aversion rather than on the level of ambiguity aversion.
[Insert Figure 5 here.]
The fund manager's optimal portfolio choice shows a monotone property with investment
opportunity (Figure 5). The fund manager is willing to decrease her risky investment as
the investment opportunity worsens, if the expected rate of stock return decreases, or the
stock volatility increases. This follows the traditional investment rule of Merton (1969, 1971);
an investor optimally increases her investment in the stock as the Sharpe ratio, (   r)=,
increases.
14We do not indicate points W2 and W3 in the gure. We have already explained the meanings of these
points in Figure 4.
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4.3 VaR-Based Risk Management
In this section, we quantify the degree to which a fund manager using VaR-based risk manage-
ment is exposed to large losses in bad states. To quantify expected losses, we introduce a loss
amount dened as the ratio between the present value of expected losses and the product of
the pre-specied probability  and the initial wealth w. The loss amount is the loss measured
by the size of the shortfall that the fund manager allows with probability  when benchmark
portfolio X is lower than tolerance k. The situation that benchmark portfolio plunges in
value represents economic downturns.
Theorem 4.1 We dene a loss amount as
L(w; ; ) = E
h(T )


W k(T ) W (T )

1fX(T )<kg
i.
( w);
where W k(T ) is wealth level that corresponds to X(T ) = k, and (t) is a state price density
(or stochastic discount factor) that satises
d(t) =  r(t)dt  dB(t); (0) =  > 0:
Then
L(w; ; ) =
1
( w)
h
N

  d2(0; x; r; 
 + 
; k)

ke
 rT  N

  d1(0; x; r; 
 + 
; k)

x
i
+ (W k(T )  k)E
h(T )

1fX(T )kg
i.
( w):
Proof. See Appendix 7.3. Q.E.D.
[Insert Table 5 here.]
The expected loss, L(), is very sensitive to changes in risk aversion  and ambiguity
aversion  (Table 5). In the absence of ambiguity aversion, a fund manager would experience
substantial losses during economic downturns, because she invests aggressively in the stock to
accumulate wealth as soon as possible. For example, for standard and moderate risk aversion
 = 2 the fund manager losses 30:6% of initial wealth during economic downturns when
 = 0. The amount of loss decreases signicantly as risk aversion  increases, and is 7:1%
when (; ) = (5; 0). The ambiguity-averse fund manager eectively reduces losses during
economic downturns. In fact, loss decreases signicantly from 30:6% when (; ) = (2; 0) to
4:7% when (; ) = (2; 3) (Table 5). Therefore, both market risk and ambiguity (or model
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uncertainty) against equity returns that whose aversions are measured by risk aversion and
ambiguity aversion, respectively, should be incorporated in VaR-based risk management.
[Insert Table 6 here.]
The eect of varying investment opportunity on the expected losses is monotonic (Table
6). Similarly to the treatment of the sensitivity of tolerance k for bearing losses to changes
in investment opportunity (Table 4), larger losses arising from the plunge of the benchmark
portfolio would be expected as the investment opportunity improves, if the expected stock
return increases, or the stock volatility decreases. Further, the aggressive risky investment
behavior when the investment opportunity improves (Figure 5) would give rise to such sub-
stantial losses when the benchmark portfolio underperforms in a nancial market.
5 Robustness
An interesting extension to this paper is to overcome the well-known limitations of the VaR
constraint.15 To consider a general and coherent risk measure, we can write the VaR constraint
in an integral form. In particular, an expected shortfall (ES) constraint imposes the percentile
for the rst moment of losses. The ES constraint satises a sub-additivity property and hence
it is a coherent risk measure. Accordingly, the ES constraint can be used as an alternative
risk measure. More specically, we consider the following constraint:
E
h
(T )

W  W (T )

1fW (T )Wg
i
 ;
where   0 is a constant. We know that
E
h
(T )

W  W (T )

1fW (T )Wg
i
= E
h
(T )

W  W (T )
W (T ) WiPfW (T ) Wg:
This implies that the ES constraint focuses on not only the shortfall probability of not sat-
isfying the terminal wealth W (T ), but also the magnitude of the shortfall given that a loss
occurs. Analogously to the consideration of the VaR constraint (1), the formulation of the ES
15VaR is not a coherent risk measure and hence it may not be appropriate as a risk measure because it would
generate large losses during economic downturns (Basak and Shapiro, 2001). Further, currently it is quickly
losing VaR's popularity in favor or risk functionals able to capture tail risk (Basel, 2012).
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constraint nets the case of portfolio insurance ( = 0) and the case of the benchmark portfolio
( =1).
As in VaR-based risk management we can quantify the degree to which a fund manager
using ES-based risk management is exposed to large losses in bad states.
Theorem 5.1 We dene a loss amount as
LES(w; ; ) = E
h(T )


W  W (T )

1fX(T )<kg
i.
:
Then L() is computed as
LES(w; ; ) =
W
k
h
N

  d2(0; x; r; 
 + 
; k)

ke
 rT  N

  d1(0; x; r; 
 + 
; k)

x
i
;
where k is a constant to be determined by the ES constraint.
Proof. See Appendix 7.4.
[Insert Table 7 here.]
The loss LES() is sensitive to changes in risk aversion  and ambiguity aversion  (Table
7). As expected, the amount of loss is lower with the ES constraint than with the VaR
constraint. When we x  = 2, the reasonably calibrated parameter of ambiguity aversion
 = 3 gives rise to 3:4% loss of initial wealth during economic downturns; the loss 15:2% in
the absence of ambiguity aversion is greatly reduced. Importantly, the expected losses are
invariant with the kind of constraints (ES or VaR) when the sum +  is large. For instance,
with (; ) = (5; 5) we expect 1:9% loss with the ES constraint and 1:7% loss with the VaR
constraint. Hence, in risk management, not only the appropriate risk measure is determined,
but also the dierences of eects of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion on optimal asset
composition should be accounted for.
[Insert Table 8 here.]
The sensitivity of the loss LES() to changes in investment opportunity is similar to the
case of the VaR constraint. Further, observe that the eects of varying expected rate  of
stock return and risk-free interest rate r are symmetric because the fund manager's optimal
portfolio choice depends on the size of risk premium   r. Accordingly, a better investment
opportunity (a higher Sharpe ratio (  r)=) induces larger losses.
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6 Conclusion
We present a model of optimal portfolio choice that integrates two main motives: a portfolio
constraint driven by the presence of a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint and ambiguity (or
model uncertainty) about equity returns. We try to focus on investigating how optimal asset
composition of a fund manager is aected by the eects of risk and ambiguity aversions,
under a VaR constraint on her nal wealth. We hope that some results of this paper will lend
themselves to the study of implications for risk management and portfolio choice in practice.
One can argue that as in Maenhout (2004), ambiguity aversion raises the level of risk
aversion by the amount of ambiguity aversion and hence that the eect of ambiguity aversion
on a fund manager's asset composition is trivial, even under a VaR constraint on her terminal
wealth. However, when a fund manager controls asset composition, her reactions dier with
respect to changes in the coecients of risk and ambiguity aversions. When the sum of coef-
cients of risk and ambiguity aversions is xed, the eect of risk aversion on risky investment
dominates the eect of ambiguity aversion in that portfolio shares are signicantly smaller in
the absence of ambiguity aversion than in its presence. As a result, dynamic portfolio decision
is more dependent on the fund manager's risk aversion rather than on the level of ambiguity
aversion.
This paper raises a number of questions that should be addressed in any future research on
the topic. First, by far the strongest assumption we have made in our modeling for nancial
markets, is that the investment opportunity set is constant: risk-free interest rate, expected
rate of stock return, and stock volatility are all constant. Thus, we have abstracted away from
time variation of the investment opportunity set. Beyond the classic Merton (1969, 1971)'s
model of dynamic portfolio choice, the next step is to allow for more realistic and complicated
dynamics for the investment opportunity set.
Second, an interesting extension of our model is to incorporate any reevaluation of a VaR
or discrete reporting a VaR. Indeed, Cuoco and Liu (2006) derive an optimal investment
strategy for nancial institutions in which they mush report their VaR given some discrete
reporting periods. Along with this line, Cuoco et al. (2008) overcome the assumption of static
or dynamically inconsistent VaR constraints as existing literature have considered. Further
research would examine the optimal asset composition including these realistic portfolio con-
straints.
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Third, we have ignored the positive equilibrium implications, under the normative focus
on the paper. The main question raised by this paper is how optimal asset composition is
aected by the eects of ambiguity (or model uncertainty), under a VaR constraint on a
fund manager's nal wealth. Importantly, a detailed equilibrium analysis would attempt to
derive the implications for equity premium and risk-free rate in a Lucas-style equilibrium
asset pricing model (Basak and Shapiro, 2001; Maenhout, 2004). However, this is far beyond
the scope of the current paper.
We believe these issues to be addressed will demand further academic attention as they
take on greater responsibility for explaining the economic relevance of ambiguity to risk
management and portfolio choice in practice.
7 Appendix
7.1 The Dynamics for Benchmark Portfolio X
According to the HJB equation (3), the optimality condition for h gives
h =  	Vw:
Substituting h into the HJB equation yields
0 = max

h
Vt + fr + (  r)gwVw + 1
2
22w2Vww   1
2
	22w2(Vw)
2
i
:
Optimal risky investment  is given by the necessary optimality condition as
 =   Vw
w
 
Vww  	(Vw)2
 

:
Then we get the following highly nonlinear dierential equation:
0 = Vt + rwVw   1
2
2
(Vw)
2 
Vww  	(Vw)2
   1
2
	2
(Vw)
4 
Vww  	(Vw)2
2 :
We introduce a nonnegative constant  as Maenhout (2004) did:
	(t; w) =

(1  )V (t; w) ;
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where  is the so-called ambiguity aversion (or homothetic robustness). Then the nonlinear
dierential equation can be rewritten by
0 = Vt + rwVw   1
2
2
(Vw)
2
(Vww   (1 )V (Vw)2)
  1
2
2

(1  )V (t; w)
(Vw)
4
(Vww   (1 )V (Vw)2)
:
If we conjecture the solution form of V as
V (t; w) = (t)
w1 
1   ;
then (t), h and  are obtained:
(t) = eb(T t); b = (1  )
h
r +
1
2

( + )2
2
i
;
h =   
 + 
; and  =

( + )
:
When we substitute h and  into the wealth process (2), we obtain the dynamics for X as
follows
dX(t) =

r +

 + 

X(t)dt+

 + 
X(t)dB(t); X(0) = x > 0:
7.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Kraft and Steensen (2013) verify that the value function V (t; w) is equivalent to the following
expectation of a function g taken at time t:
V (t; w) = Et
h
g
 
X(T )
i
;
where time-t wealth W (t) and the function g are related as
W (t) W (t; x) = EQt
h
e r(T t)g
 
X(T )
i
; (5)
where Q is a risk-neutral measure. Under the Q measure, the dynamics for X is given by
dX(t) = rX(t)dt+

 + 
X(t)d ~B(t);
where ~B(t)  B(t) + t is a standard Brownian motion under the Q measure. Note that
time-t wealth W (t; x) can be regarded as an option price for a contingent claim g, where
Wt = rW   rxWx   1
2
 
 + 
2
x2Wxx; W (T; x) = g(x):
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We now introduce a Lagrangian multiplier  so that the fund manager's optimization
problem with the VaR constraint is transformed into an unconstrained problem. More specif-
ically, the value function V follows
V (t; w) = Et
h
~u

g
 
X(T )
i
;
where
~u(x) =
x1 
1     1fx<Wg
and a contingent claim g of X should be appropriately determined by the VaR constraint.
We conjecture the solution form g as follows:
g(x) = x+ (W   x)1fx<Wg   (k   x)1fx<kg   (W   k)1fx<kg;
where a constant k is attained by Pfg
 
X(T )

< Wg = . This conjecture can be veried
by the two steps. In the rst step, we assume that the pre-specied condence level  = 1.
Then the fund manager should buy a put option on her nal wealth with the strike price W .
This can be captured by the term
x+ (W   x)1fx<Wg:
For the next step, within a specied condence level 0   < 1, extreme losses are allowed
and hence selling another put option with the lower strike price k than W can be considered
in the optimal strategy for the fund manager with the VaR constraint. Accordingly, this
results in the following:
x+ (W   x)1fk<x<Wg;
which is equivalent to the conjectured form of g.
The relationship (5) gives that
W (t; x) = EQt
h
e r(T t)
n
X(T ) + (W  X(T ))1fX(T )<Wg   (k  X(T ))1fX(T )<kg
  (W   k)1fX(T )<kg
oi
= x+N

  d2(t; x; r; 
 + 
;W )

We r(T t)  N

  d1(t; x; r; 
 + 
;W )

x
 
n
N

  d2(t; x; r; 
 + 
; k)

ke
 r(T t)  N

  d1(t; x; r; 
 + 
; k)

x
o
  (W   k)e r(T t)PQfX(T ) < kg
= x+ Put

t; x; r;

 + 
;W

  Put

t; x; r;

 + 
; k

  (W   k)e r(T t)PQfX(T ) < kg:
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Furthermore, the value function V is given by
V (t; x)  V (t; w;x) = Et
h
~u

g
 
X(T )
i
= Et
h 1
1  
n
X(T ) +
 
W  X(T )1fX(T )<Wg    k  X(T )1fX(T )<kg   (W   k)1fX(T )<kgo1 
  1fX(T )<kg
i
=
e~r(T t)
1  
h
x1  +N

  d2(t; x1  ; ~r; (1  )
 + 
;W 1 )

W 1 e ~r(T t)
 N

  d1
 
t; x1  ; ~r;
(1  )
 + 
;W 1 )

x1   
n
N

  d2(t; x1  ; ~r; (1  )
 + 
; k1  )

 k1  e ~r(T t)  N

  d1
 
t; x1  ; ~r;
(1  )
 + 
; k1  )

x1 
oi
  e
~r(T t)
1  

W 1    k1  + (1  )

e ~r(T t)PfX(T ) < kg
=
e~r(T t)
1  
h
x1  + Put

t; x1  ; ~r;
(1  )
 + 
;W 1 

  Put

t; x1  ; ~r;
(1  )
 + 
; k1 
i
  e
~r(T t)
1  

W 1    k1  + (1  )

e ~r(T t)PfX(T ) < kg;
where
~r = (1  )

r +
1
2

 + 

:
One can easily verify the following relationships:
@
@x
Put

t; x; r;

 + 
;W

=
x
1  
@
@x
Put

t; x1  ; ~r;
(1  )
 + 
;W 1 

;
e ~r(T t)
@
@x
PfX(T ) < kg =
 x
k
 
e r(T t)
@
@x
PQfX(T ) < kg;
leading to the following equation:
Vx(t; w;x) = e
~r(T t)x Wx(t; x)
under the condition that
 = (W   k)k   
W 1 
1   +
k1 
1   :
According to the above condition, when the constant k is achieved by Pfg
 
X(T )

< Wg = 
the Lagrangian multiplier  is also determined.
Also, a direct computation results in
Vxx(t; w;x) =  e~r(T t)x  1Wx(t; x) + e~r(T t)x Wxx(t; x):
Then we obtain
 xVxx
Vx
=  xWxx
Wx
+ : (6)
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By the chain rule, we get
Vx = VwWx and Vxx = Vww(Wx)
2 + VwWxx: (7)
Hence,
 xVxx
Vx
=  xfVww(Wx)
2 + VwWxxg
VwWx
=  xVww
Vw
Wx   xWxx
Wx
:
Using the relation of (6), we obtain
Vww
Vw
=   
xWx
: (8)
Recall that optimality condition for risky investment is given by
 =  

1
w

Vww
Vw
  (1 ) VwV
 :
Utilizing the equations of (6), (7), and (8) concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1
One can show that
L(x;w; ) = E
h(T )


W k(T )  g(X(T ))

1fg(X(T ))<kg
i.
( w)
= E
h(T )


W (k)  g(X(T ))

1fX(T )<kg
i.
( w)
= E
h(T )

(W (k) X(T ))1fX(T )<kg
i.
( w)
= E
h(T )

(k  X(T ))1fX(T )kg
i.
( w) + E
h(T )

(W (k)  k)1fX(T )kg
i.
( w)
=
1
( w)
h
N

  d2(0; x; r; 
 + 
; k)

ke
 rT  N

  d1(0; x; r; 
 + 
; k)

x
i
+ (W k(T )  k)E
h(T )

1fX(T )kg
i.
( w):
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7.4 Proof of Theorem 5.1
A straightforward calculation yields
L(x;w; ) = E
h(T )


W   g(X(T ))

1fg(X(T ))<kg
i.

= E
h(T )


W   g(X(T ))

1fX(T )<kg
i.

= E
h(T )


W   W
k
X(T )

1fX(T )<kg
i.

=
W
k
E
h
(T )(k  X(T ))1fX(T )<kg
i
=
W
k
h
N

  d2(0; x; r; 
 + 
; k)

ke
 rT  N

  d1(0; x; r; 
 + 
; k)

x
i
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the level of fund managers' ambiguity aversion 
0 0.5 1 3 5 10
1.5 131.3% 98.5% 78.8% 43.8% 30.3% 17.1%
2 98.5% 78.8% 65.7% 39.4% 28.1% 16.4%
5 39.4% 35.8% 32.8% 24.6% 19.7% 13.1%
10 19.7% 18.8% 17.9% 15.2% 13.1% 9.8%
(a) portfolio share

the level of fund managers' ambiguity aversion 
0 0.5 1 3 5 10
1.5 7.5% 5.6% 4.5% 2.5% 1.7% 1%
2 7.5% 6.0% 5.0% 3.0% 2.1% 1.3%
5 7.5% 6.8% 6.3% 4.7% 3.8% 2.5%
10 7.5% 7.2% 6.8% 5.8% 5.0% 3.8%
(b) equity premium
Table 1: The sensitivity of portfolio share and equity premium to changes in risk
aversion  and ambiguity aversion . Parameter values are set as follows: r = 0:0371,
 = 0:1123,  = 0:1954, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, and x = 1.
Parameters Symbol Value
Risk-free interest rate r 3:71%
Expected rate of stock return  11:23%
Stock volatility  19:54%
Terminal time for a fund manager T 1
The probability of allowing the shortfall from VaR constraint  1%
The oor of wealth W 0:9
Initial value for underlying asset X x 1
Relative risk aversion  2
Ambiguity aversion  3
Table 2: Summary of parameters.
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the level of fund managers' ambiguity aversion 
0 0.5 1 3 5 10
1.5 0.6102 0.6883 0.7428 0.8568 0.9074 0.9611
2 0.7012 0.7517 0.7893 0.8754 0.9174 0.9647
5 0.8911 0.9015 0.9106 0.9376 0.9553 0.9806
10 0.9624 0.9652 0.9679 0.9768 0.9838 0.9959
Table 3: The sensitivity of tolerance k for bearing losses to changes in risk aversion
 and ambiguity aversion . Parameter values are set as follows: r = 0:0371,  = 0:1123,
 = 0:1954, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, and x = 1.
n 0.1754 0.1854 0.1954 0.2054 0.2154
0.0923 0.9018 0.9084 0.9143 0.9198 0.9248
0.1023 0.8802 0.8877 0.8945 0.9007 0.9064
0.1123 0.8595 0.8678 0.8754 0.8823 0.8887
0.1223 0.8397 0.8487 0.8570 0.8645 0.8715
0.1323 0.8206 0.8303 0.8392 0.8473 0.8549
Table 4: The sensitivity of tolerance k for bearing losses to changes in expected
rate  of stock return and stock volatility . Parameter values are set as follows:
r = 0:0371,  = 2,  = 3, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, and x = 1.

the level of fund managers' ambiguity aversion 
0 0.5 1 3 5 10
1.5 32.8% 25.5% 20.6% 5.9% 2.0% 1.0%
2 30.6% 23.8% 17.8% 4.7% 1.8% 1.0%
5 7.1% 5.3% 4.0% 2.1% 1.7% 1.1%
7 3.5% 3.0% 2.7% 1.9% 1.6% 1.1%
10 2.7% 2.5% 2.3% 1.9% 1.5% 1.0%
Table 5: The sensitivity of expected losses L() to changes in risk aversion  and
ambiguity aversion . Parameter values are set as follows: r = 0:0371,  = 0:1123,
 = 0:1954, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, x = 1, and  = 1.
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n 0.1754 0.1854 0.1954 0.2054 0.2154
0.0923 2.6% 2.2% 1.9% 1.7% 1.5%
0.1023 4.2% 3.6% 3.0% 2.6% 2.3%
0.1123 6.5% 5.5% 4.7% 4.0% 3.5%
0.1223 9.2% 7.9% 6.8% 5.9% 5.1%
0.1323 12.3% 10.7% 9.3% 8.1% 7.1%
Table 6: The sensitivity of expected losses L() to changes in expected rate  of
stock return and stock volatility . Parameter values are set as follows: r = 0:0371,
 = 2,  = 3, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, x = 1, and  = 1.

the level of fund managers' ambiguity aversion 
0 0.5 1 3 5 10
1.5 19.5% 11.8% 8.2% 3.5% 2.2% 1.1%
2 15.2% 10.1% 7.4% 3.4% 2.2% 1.1%
5 6.4% 5.4% 4.6% 2.8% 1.9% 1.1%
7 4.6% 4.1% 3.6% 2.4% 1.8% 1.0%
10 3.3% 3.0% 2.7% 2.0% 1.6% 1.0%
Table 7: The sensitivity of expected losses LES() to changes in risk aversion 
and ambiguity aversion . Parameter values are set as follows: r = 0:0371,  = 0:1123,
 = 0:1954, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, x = 1, and  = 1.
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n 0.1754 0.1854 0.1954 0.2054 0.2154
0.0923 2.6% 2.4% 2.3% 2.1% 2.0%
0.1023 3.3% 3.0% 2.8% 2.6% 2.5%
0.1123 4.0% 3.7% 3.4% 3.2% 3.0%
0.1223 4.8% 4.4% 4.1% 3.8% 3.6%
0.1323 5.7% 5.3% 4.9% 4.5% 4.2%
(a) r = 0:0371
rn 0.1754 0.1854 0.1954 0.2054 0.2154
0.0171 5.8% 5.4% 5.0% 4.6% 4.3%
0.0271 4.9% 4.5% 4.2% 3.9% 3.6%
0.0371 4.0% 3.7% 3.4% 3.2% 3.0%
0.0471 3.2% 3.0% 2.8% 2.6% 2.5%
0.0571 2.6% 2.4% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0%
(b)  = 0:1123
Table 8: The sensitivity of expected losses LES() to changes in expected rate  of
stock return, risk-free interest rate r, and stock volatility . Parameter values are
set as follows:  = 2,  = 3, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, x = 1, and  = 1.
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(a)  = 0
(b)  = 3
Figure 1: Terminal wealth management W (T ). Parameter values are set as follows:
r = 0:0371,  = 0:1123,  = 0:1954, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, x = 1, and  = 2.
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(a)  = 0
(b)  = 3
Figure 2: Time-t wealth management W (t). Parameter values are set as follows: r =
0:0371,  = 0:1123,  = 0:1954, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, x = 1, and  = 2.
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Figure 3: Optimal risky investment (t). Parameter values are set as follows: r = 0:0371,
 = 0:1123,  = 0:1954, t = 0:5, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, x = 1, and  = 2.
Figure 4: Optimal risky investment (t). Parameter values are set as follows: r = 0:0371,
 = 0:1123,  = 0:1954, t = 0:5, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, and x = 1. In the gure,  = 5
and  = 3 represent (; ) = (5; 0) and (; ) = (2; 3), respectively. We assume that the sum
 +  is xed to 5.
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Figure 5: Optimal risky investment (t) with respect to changes in expected rate
 of stock return and stock volatility . Parameter values are set as follows: r = 0:0371,
 = 2,  = 3,  = 0:1954, t = 0:5, T = 1,  = 0:01, W = 0:9, and x = 1.
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